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ABSTRACT
Parties who make investments that generate externalities may sometimes recover
from the beneficiaries, even in the absence of contract. Previous scholarship has
shown that granting recovery, based on either the cost of the investment or the benefit
it confers, can provide optimal incentives to invest. However, this article
demonstrates that the law often awards recovery that is neither purely cost-based, nor
purely benefit-based, and instead equals either the greater-of or lesser-of the two
measures. These hybrid approaches to recovery distort incentives to invest. The
article demonstrates the prevalence of these practices, and explores informational and
related reasons why they emerge. It argues that they generally are ill-suited to
promote rational policies.
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INTRODUCTION
Private parties often make investments that benefit others. Such investments are usually
made under contract with the beneficiaries. The contract determines the investing party’s right to
recover and the measure of that recovery. Sometimes, however, a party considering making an
investment is unable to contract with its potential beneficiaries. In these situations, the investing
party must rely upon the law to create an obligation on the part of others to pay for the service.
Indeed, private law is replete with doctrines enabling an investing party to recover in the
absence of contract. For example, a co-owner may recoup the costs of repairs she makes to coowned property, and a doctor may recover a fee for treating an unconscious accident victim. In
measuring the recovery, the law normally utilizes one of two approaches. In some instances,
recovery is measured by the benefit from the investment: the obligor has to pay in accordance
with the actual benefit she enjoyed. In other instances, recovery is measured by the investment’s
cost. A great deal of legal order has been created along this cost versus benefit distinction
(Atiyah (1979, pp. 149-152, 184-189). For example, the law of torts defines obligations that are
cost-based, whereas the law of restitution defines obligations that are benefit-based.
The right to recover in the absence of contract has been rationalized from an economic
(that is, incentive-oriented) perspective (Landes and Posner 1978; Levmore 1985). In particular,
it has been defended on the grounds that it encourages parties to make desirable investments that
they would otherwise forego, usually because of the difficulty of contracting with the
beneficiaries. This paper does not directly take issue with the economic literature demonstrating
the desirability of imposing liability in such circumstances. Rather, it explores a systematic and
puzzling inconsistency in the way the law actually determines the magnitude of liability. Using
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economic analysis, it exposes confusion concerning the use of cost versus benefit to measure
recovery, and the resulting distortion in incentives.
The common situation in which this inconsistency arises involves an investment that is
expected to yield an uncertain benefit to another party. This is an investment that confers a
chance, or probabilistic value, as opposed to certain benefit. Examples are abundant: owners of
land make investments to repair or improve co-owned property that might, but are not certain to,
increase the market value of the property; insured parties take precautions that might, but are not
certain to, reduce the losses that their insurers have to cover; attorneys pursue legal actions that
might result in favorable judgments or settlements for their clients. By the time the law has to
determine the recovery ex-post, the actual benefit—or lack thereof—becomes known and
(usually) can be verified by the court.
If the investing party is entitled to recover, it might be expected that courts would
measure the recovery either on the basis of the recipient’s benefit, or on the basis of the
investor’s costs. The benefit-based measure would depend on (and is potentially equal to) the
actual benefit that materialized. This is an ex-post recovery regime: the investing party will enjoy
a high recovery when the court observes that the benefit is high, and a low recovery when the
court observes a low benefit. The cost-based measure, alternatively, would not depend on any expost realization of benefit. Instead, and irrespective of whether the actual benefit is high or low,
this measure would award a recovery that is fixed, equal to the reasonable economic cost of
undertaking the investment. Under either the benefit-based or the cost-based regimes, if
appropriately applied, the investment would be taken if and only if it is cost-justified. 1
__________________________________________________________
1

Whether the benefit-based approach is superior to the cost-based approach (e.g., for reasons of fairness,
information and administration costs, or risk) is beyond the scope of this analysis. See, e.g., Polinsky and Shavell
(1994) and Wittman (1985).

2
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It turns out, however, that in many circumstances, the law takes neither a pure benefitbased nor a pure cost-based approach to measuring recovery. Instead, it often uses one of two
“hybrid” recovery approaches. Under one approach, the investing party can recover either the expost benefit enjoyed by the beneficiary, or the cost of the investment, and can elect the greater of
the two. This approach, which we label the “greater-of” regime, permits the investing party to
recover the full benefit when it is high, or recover the cost of the investment when the benefit is
low (or zero). The expected recovery under this approach is greater—potentially far greater—
than the expected benefit of the investment, creating excessive incentives to invest.
Under a second hybrid approach, which we label the “lesser-of” regime, the investing
party can again recover either the ex-post benefit enjoyed by the beneficiary, or the cost of the
investment, but this time she is limited to the lesser of the two. The investing party can
effectively recover the full benefit only when it is low; when the benefit turns out to be high,
recovery is capped at the cost of the investment. The expected recovery under this approach is
lower than the expected benefit of the investment, creating insufficient incentives to invest.
For example, consider a party who invests in a project potentially adding value to a
neighbor’s land, in a setting that gives rise to a restitutionary right of recovery. A benefit-based
regime would set the recovery equal to the actual enhancement value enjoyed by the neighbor. A
cost-based regime would set the recovery equal to the cost of the investment, if it is adjudged
reasonable. A greater-of regime would permit the investing party to recover the full benefit when
the enhancement value is high, and recover her costs when the enhancement value is low.
Section II.E of the paper will demonstrate that this is a recovery strategy available to investing
co-owners under the repairs and improvements doctrine in property law. On the other hand, a
lesser-of regime would limit the investing party to recover the full benefit when this benefit is
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low and only her costs when the benefit is high. Section II.F of the paper will demonstrate that
this is the recovery schedule available to mistaken improvers under the Restatement of
Restitution.
The distortion this article attributes to the hybrid recovery regimes can be further
illustrated with a lottery metaphor. Suppose party A owns a lottery ticket that provides a 1%
chance of winning $1000, and a 99% chance of winning 0. The ex-ante value of such a ticket—
its actuarial cost—is $10. Party A mistakenly loses her lottery ticket at party B’s home and
discovers the loss after the lottery draw was announced. Under the pure benefit-based recovery
regime, party A can recover from party B (who found and cashed the ticket) either 0 or $1000,
depending on the ticket’s actual draw. Under the pure cost-based recovery regime, party A can
recover the ex-ante value, or the cost of the ticket, $10, independent of the actual draw. The
expected recovery under both regimes is $10, correctly reflecting the value of the ticket at the
time it was lost. Consider, in contrast, the two hybrid approaches described above. Under the
greater-of approach, party A can recover $1000 if the ticket wins, and can recover $10 if the
ticket’s draw is 0. The expected recovery is approximately $20, twice the ex-ante expected value
of the ticket (the ticket is worth more if lost; party A would have an incentive to lose it!). Under
the lesser-of approach, party A can recover only $10 if the ticket wins, and recover 0 when the
ticket’s draw is 0. The expected recovery is 10 cents, well below the ex-ante expected value of
the ticket.
The article proceeds in three steps. First, Section I develops a formal economic model of
the distortion in investment incentives created under the hybrid regimes. Next, Section II of the
paper briefly surveys several prominent recovery doctrines in private law, and demonstrates that
hybrid regimes are of significant practical concern. Finally, the third, and perhaps the most
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interesting part of the article, explores why the hybrid approaches are used so frequently in the
law, despite the obvious distortions they create. This inquiry, which is developed in Section III,
demonstrates that courts occasionally employ hybrid rules inadvertently, due to information
problems and the difficulty of drawing boundaries between related causes of action. Other times,
when hybrid regimes are employed deliberately to adjust the magnitude of recovery, economic
analysis shows that they often fail to serve their stated purposes. The paper concludes by offering
possible extensions and interpretations of the analysis.
I. A S IMPLE M ODEL OF INVESTMENT WITH UNCERTAIN B ENEFIT
A. The Framework of Analysis
Suppose that party A can spend a cost C that would yield a random benefit to party B
(and 0 benefit to party A). For simplicity and without loss of generality, assume that the benefit
to party B might be either high or low, with the high benefit denoted by V and the low benefit
fixed at 0. The exogenous probabilities of V and 0 are p and 1−p, respectively. Assume also that
the parties are both risk- neutral and are unable to form a contract governing this investment.
(Some of these assumptions are relaxed later.)
It is socially desirable for party A to spend C if and only if:
C ≤ pV.
Party A’s private decision whether to incur C would depend, however, on the legal regime
governing her right to recover for her efforts.
B. The Pure Benefit-Based and Cost-Based Regimes
Under the benefit-based recovery regime, party A can recover the full ex-post benefit
conferred upon party B. Thus, party A can recover V with probability p and 0 otherwise, for an
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expected recovery of pV. Party A will invest if and only if C ≤ pV, which is socially optimal. 2
Under the cost-based regime, party A’s recovery is independent of the ex-post realization
of benefit, and equals the ex-ante value of her investment. We consider two versions of an exante regime. In theory, a “pure” ex-ante regime is one in which the measure of recovery is the
average, or expected benefit pV. If party A is entitled to recover pV regardless of the realization
of benefit, she will invest if and only if C ≤ pV, which guarantees socially optimal investment.
The more practically significant version of the ex-ante regime is the pure cost-based regime, in
which the recovery is equal to party A’s cost of investment, C. To guarantee that party A will
invest C only when socially optimal, recovery should be conditional on C ≤ pV; namely, on the
cost being “reasonable.” Like the benefit-based regime, the cost-based regime generates optimal
incentives to exert effort.
C. The Hybrid Regimes
1. The greater-of regime
Under one type of hybrid regime, the greater-of regime, party A receives the ex-post
benefit measure when the realization of benefit is high, and receives her cost when the realization
of benefit is low. Thus, party A receives a recovery of V when the benefit is V and receives a
recovery of C when the benefit is 0. Party A’s net expected payoff is:
pV + (1 − p) C - C = p(V − C),
which is greater than pV – C, the net social gain from investment, for all p < 1. Party A will
over- invest: whenever pV < C ≤ V, party A will invest although it is too costly from a social
__________________________________________________________
2

Other hypothetical “ex-post”, or benefit-based recovery rules which make recovery dependent on—but not exactly
equal to—the actual benefit, still provide optimal incentives, as long as the expected recovery equals the expected
benefit. For example, optimal incentives are provided under an entire family of “multiplier rules”, under which, for
all m = 1, party A can recover mV from a fraction 1/m of the V-type beneficiaries, and 0 otherwise. The expected
recovery under such rules is again pV. The m multiplier can represent, for example, a recovery enhancement in
situations where the likelihood of successful suit is only 1/m. See, e.g., Polinsky and Shavell (1998).
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point of view. Intuitively, the distortion in this case arises from the fact that, with some
likelihood, the investing party will externalize her cost. If a high benefit occurs, the investing
party internalizes both the cost and the benefit; but if the benefit is low, the cost of the
investment is externalized. 3
To illustrate, consider an investment of $120 that yields an expected benefit of $100.
Socially, it is inefficient. If, however, the benefit is probabilistic, with 50% chance of $150 and
50% chance of $50, party A will take it. Under the greater-of regime, party A will get either
$150 (when the benefit is $150) or $120 (when the benefit is $50), for an expected recovery of
$135, well exceeding the cost of the investment. The greater the variance of the benefit, the
greater are party A’s excessive incentives to invest (e.g., if the benefit is either $200 or $0,
equally likely, the expected recovery balloons to $160.)
This illustration can be gene ralized: the greater-of regime is equivalent to a benefit-based
regime compounded by a put option for party A – an option to “sell” the benefit for C. If the expost value arising from the investment falls below C, party A will exercise the option and receive
C; and if the ex-post value realizes above C, party A will not exercise the option and will receive
instead the full ex-post value, V. Thus, the distortion under the greater-of approach depends on
factors similar to those that affect option prices, suc h as the variance of the distribution of
benefits, 4 and the time period that party A has to exercise the option (Jackson 1978).
__________________________________________________________
3

A similar distortion arises when the ex-ante measure of recovery equals pV, rather than C. In this case, a greater-of
regime entitles party A to recover the actual benefit or the expected benefit whichever is higher. Accordingly, party
A’s expected recovery under this hybrid rule is pV + (1 − p)pV = pV (2 − p), which exceeds the expected social
benefit, pV, whenever p < 1.
4

For example, consider a perturbation of the benefit values to {a, V-b} for some small a,b, such that the mean of the
distribution remains unchanged, pV (namely, if the probability of the high value V-b remains p, b = a[p/(1-p)]. For
this reduced-variance distribution, the expected net recovery under the greater-of regime is p(V-a)+(1-p)C – C =
p(V-C) – pa, which is smaller (by an amount pa) than the expected recovery under the higher-variance distribution.
The smaller the variance (a higher a), the lower the expected net recovery.
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2. The lesser-of regime
Under the lesser-of hybrid regime, party A receives the ex-post benefit when the
realization of benefit is low, but receives only her cost when the realization of benefit is high.
Thus, party A receives a recovery of 0 when the benefit is 0 and a recovery of C when the benefit
is V. Under the lesser-of regime, party A’s expected net recovery is:
pC + (1 – p)0 – C = –(1 – p)C,
which is negative, and in particular it is less than pV – C, the social gain from investment, for all
1 > p > 0. The lesser-of regime generates no incentives to invest: whenever 0 ≤ C ≤ pV, party A
will not invest although the investment is socially desirable. Intuitively, the under- investment
arises from the fact that the investing party internalizes the entire cost but does not get to enjoy
the entire benefit. 5
To illustrate, consider an investment of $80 that yields an expected bene fit of $100.
Socially, it is an efficient investment. If, however, the benefit is probabilistic, with 50% chance
of $150 and 50% chance of $50, party A will not take it. Under the lesser-of regime, party A will
get either $80 (when the benefit is $150) or $50 (when the benefit is $50), for an expected
recovery of $65, well below the cost of the investment.
II. THE DOCTRINAL PREVALENCE OF H YBRID R EGIMES
Given the apparent shortcomings of the hybrid approaches, the reader may be left
wondering whether these devices are of any practical concern. Accordingly, the objective of this
Section is to demonstrate the prevalent use of the hybrid approaches across a broad range of legal
doctrines, and thereby to dispel any notion that hybrids are a mere esoteric phenomenon.
__________________________________________________________
5

Here, as in the greater-of regime, the magnitude of the distortion is equal to the value of an option, this time a call
option given to party B, to “buy” the benefit at a price of C. If the ex-post benefit realizes above C, party B will
exercise the option and pay only C; and if the ex-post benefit realizes below C, party B will not exercise the option
and instead will pay the benefit. The value of this option is the amount by which party A is under-compensated.
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Understanding the context in which hybrid regimes operate will also help us develop, in Section
III, a more general discussion of the reasons--good or bad--why hybrids are used with such
surprising frequency.
A. Implied Contracts
In drafting the provisions of their contract, parties are free to determine whether the
beneficiary’s obligation to pay is to be based on effort (as are most contracts), or whether it is to
be contingent on success. In the absence of an explicit contract between the parties, however, it
is up to the law to determine the recovery for services rendered.
Normally, the absence of an explicit contract means no obligation to pay. However, the
doctrine of implied contracts sometimes imposes such an obligation. A typical situation in which
an implied obligation arises is when one party performs a service during negotiations over a
contract. The party providing the service may do so in anticipation of striking a deal, at the
encouragement of the other party, or in an attempt to convinc e the other party that a deal is
desirable. For example, an advertising agency might develop an idea for an advertising campaign
and, in bidding for the client’s account, share it with the client. If negotiations eventually break
down, the investing party might seek to recover its costs or the value it created for the other party
Doctrinally, courts distinguish between two types of obligations that might be imputed,
labeled implied- in- fact and implied- in- law contracts. An implied- in-fact contract may be found
where actions other than an express promise indicate that the beneficiary intended to pay for the
service. Here, as in many other areas of contract law, the parties’ expectation is determined not
merely from the text of their agreement (or lack thereof), but from the context as well. An
implied- in-law contract, in contrast, arises even in the absence of any reliable indication of the
parties’ intentions. It is based, instead, on the benefit, and is intended to strip the beneficiary of
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this gain if the acquisition is deemed unjust under the established principles of the law of
restitution (Farnsworth 1999, pp. 499-501).
The two types of implied contracts also lead to different measures of recovery. An
implied- in-fact contract, once inferred, is supplemented by courts to include a provision
mimicking the fee that an express contract would have stipulated, which is usually (though not
necessarily) calculated on a per-effort basis. In the advertising contract example above, it would
require the client to pay the firm for the billable hours it spent on the project. In contrast, an
implied- in-law obligation, once constructed, often leads to restitution of the full benefit enjoyed
by the beneficiary. 6 The client would have to pay the value it actually derived from the
advertising campaign, which can potentially differ from the contract fee.
Put in terms of the analysis in Section I, the implied- in- fact doctrine embodies a costbased (or fee-based) recovery approach, whereas the implied- in- law doctrine embodies a benefitbased recovery approach. As argued in Section I, either regime, if applied consistently and in the
appropriate situations, can lead to optimal pre-contractual effort.
A distortion arises, however, when the plaintiff can elect the greater of the two recovery
measures. In particular, when courts allow a party who conferred a high benefit to seek the
restitutionary implied- in- law recovery for the entire benefit, and a party who conferred a low (or
zero) benefit to seek the implied-in- fact recovery for the per-effort fee, excessive recovery
results. She will get the full benefit when the benefit is high, and more than the full benefit when
the benefit is low, a recovery schedule that exceeds the expected benefit from her effort.
__________________________________________________________
6

In rewarding the value the benefit conferred, courts use one of two possible measures, equal either to the “net
enrichment”, namely, the increase in total wealth to the beneficiary, or to the “cost avoided”, namely, the saving to
the beneficiary in obtaining the service (Farnsworth 1999, p. 107; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS, §371).
It is only when a “net enrichment” measure is applied that the recovery under an implied-in -law claim differs from
the recovery under an implied-in-fact claim.
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The implied-contracts doctrine falls occasionally into this greater-of trap. Whenever a
court is willing to recognize an implied contract, the plaintiff would often be able to satisfy the
elements of both types of implied-contract claims. 7 While acknowledging the difference between
the two types of claims, courts often accord plaintiffs the power to choose between them. In the
casebook favorite Hill v. Waxberg, for example, a contractor who was negotiating a building
project invested in “plans, ideas, and efforts” that benefited the landowner after negotiations
broke down. In allowing a recovery, the court didactically distinguished between the two types
of implied contracts and their associated recovery measures, and confirmed the plaintiff’s right to
choose between them. 8 Accordingly, it was suggested that, even when no actual benefit
materializes, an implied- in- fact claim for the services should lie (Farnsworth, 1987, p. 232).
Thus, when the benefit conferred upon the other party is low, the investing party is generally
encouraged to seek a recovery of her cost or hypothetical fee, based on an implied- in-fact
contract claim. 9 And when the benefit is high, the investing party is not precluded from making
an implied- in- law contract claim for the full benefit conferred.
This greater-of approach is further facilitated by procedural rules regarding the election
of remedies. Specifically, plaintiffs are permitted to offer several alternative theories of recovery
and to delay their commitment to any particular remedy until the stage of trial at which it will
become clear which recovery measure is higher, and even to amend the complaint if they
__________________________________________________________
7

Indeed, similar grounds give rise to implied contracts under either doctrine. These grounds often have to do with
high transactions costs involved in drafting explicit contracts (Posner 1998, pp 151-2).
8

The court noted that “the elements of either theory could be satisfied, but since counsel has declined to choose
between them, we are not prepared to make the choice for him.” 237 F. 2d 936, 939 (9th Cir. 1956) (emphasis
added). See also Bastian v. Gafford, 563 P.2d 48 (Idaho 1977) (when an implied-in-law action fails due to the
absence of actual enrichment, recovery may instead be based on an implied-in -fact claim for the standard fee).
9

Earhart v. William Low Company, 600 P.2d 1344 (Cal. 1979) (in the absence of actual benefit to the defendant, the
recovery of expenses incurred is allowed).
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originally stated only the lower theory of recovery. 10
B. Remedies for Breach of Contract
A similar greater-of approach is embodied in the choice of remedies available for breach
of an explicit contract. There are two typical situations in which this election-of-remedy issue
arises. The first situation involves total breach or repudiation of a contract after one party has
partially performed. The aggrieved party may seek either expectation damages or restitution.
That is, she can either enforce the bargain and sue for “make whole” damages, calculated in
accordance with the contract price, or disaffirm the materially breached bargain—employ a legal
fiction that the contract ceased to exist—and recover damages equal to the benefit conferred on
the breaching party (RESTATEMENT 2D OF CONTRACTS § 373; Kull, 1994).
This is a greater-of hybrid regime. When the benefit the breaching party enjoys from
partial performance is low, the aggrieved party would seek the standard expectation remedy, that
being greater than the ex-post benefit. But when the benefit to the breaching party from the
partial performance is high, the aggrieved party can receive more than the adjusted contract price
by recovering the ex-post value of the partial performance. 11 Again, procedural rules enable the
aggrieved party to join in the complaint a claim for restitution recovery (in quantum meruit) and
a claim for expectation damages, thus postponing the election of the remedy until it becomes
clear, at trial, which of the two measures is greater. This greater-of regime for total breach is
reinforced by the way restitution damages are calculated. Under the Restatement of Contracts,
__________________________________________________________
10

Matarese v. Moore-McCormack Lines, Inc., 158 F.2d 631 (2nd Cir. 1947) (permitting amendment of the complaint
from a suit based on express contract to one based on the theory of unjust enrichment); Frontier Management Co. v.
Balboa Ins. Co. 658 F. Supp. 987, 994 (D. Mass. 1986) (holding that plaintiff may plead unjust enrichment merely
on the possibility that its contractual claims will prove inadequate at trial).
11

Boomer v. Muir, 24 P.2d 570, 577 (Cal. App. 1933) (“[U]pon prevention of performance the injured plaintiff may
treat the contract as rescinded and recover upon a quantum meruit without regard to the contract price.”); see also
Kull (1994, pp. 1477, 1498).
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the benefit to the breaching party may be measured by either the market price for furnishing a
service, or the extent to which the beneficiary’s property has been enhanced in value by the
service. When the enhancement-in- value measure of benefit is low, the aggrieved party is
encouraged to seek the more generous market-price measure of restitution, 12 and when the
enhancement- in- value measure is high, the aggrieved party is entitled to seek this larger sum. As
a leading case summarizes: “the rule has evolved that the proper measure of damages in unjust
enrichment should be the greater of the two measures.”13
A second typical situation in which the greater-of damage measure applies is in an action
for breach of warranty of title. A buyer who purchases an asset from a seller who is not the true
owner and later has to surrender the purchased asset to its true owner, can recover from the seller
either the purchase price or the ex-post value of the asset at the time it was surrendered,
whichever is greater. Thus, when the asset depreciates in value below the price paid, the buyer
can recover the price. And when the asset’s value increases, the buyer can recover the full value,
uncapped by the contract price. 14
C. Attorney Fees
Recovery of attorney fees is commonly go verned by a hybrid regime. This Part considers
three prominent examples. The first involves a trial attorney’s right to recover from her client
after being discharged without cause prior to the conclusion of litigation. The second example
__________________________________________________________
12

REST . 2D CONTRACTS §371 cmt. b (“[T]he reasonable value to the party from whom restitution is sought is usually
greater than the addition to his wealth. If this is so, a party seeking restitution for part performance is commonly
allowed the more generous measure of reasonable value. . .”).
13

Robertus v. Candee, 670 P.2d 540, 543.

14

Menzel v. List, 246 N.E.2d 742 (N.Y. 1969); W ILLISTON (1960, §1395A) (limiting damages to the purchase price
“virtually confines the buyer to rescission and restitution, a remedy to which the injured buyer is undoubtedly
entitled if he so elects, but it is a violation of general principles of contracts to deny him in an action on the contract
such damages as will put him in as good a position as he would have occupied had the contract been kept”).
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concerns a defendant’s right to seek indemnification of litigation expenses that run to the benefit
of third parties. The third and final case regards a litigant’s right to recover attorney fees from
opposing parties.
1. Discharge of an attorney-client contract
Trial attorneys are typically compensated using one of two possible formulae. Under one
approach—the billable hours contract—the attorney is paid the same fee regardless of the
outcome of the litigation. This fee is calculated by multiplying the number of hours the attorney
worked on the case by a pre-agreed hourly rate. The alternative approach is the contingency- fee
contract, under which the attorney is paid a portion of the client’s award. If the client’s claim is
denied, the attorney recovers nothing, but if the client’s claim prevails, the attorney receives a
substantial premium vis a vis the billable hours contract.
To protect the interests of clients, courts have traditionally held that a client has an
“unfettered” right to discharge an attorney working under either type of contract. When the client
exercises this right before the conclusion of litigation and dismisses her attorney without cause,
the question arises as to whether and how the dismissed attorney is to be compensated for the
services she has already provided the client. This situation fits well into the framework of this
paper, since the benefit to the client at the time the lawyer rendered the services—before the
client’s case is resolved—is still probabilistic.
Consider first the law governing discharge of the attorney working under a billable-hours
contract. Nearly every jurisdiction permits such an attorney to recover her fee from the client,
regardless of the outcome of the litigation (Annotation, 1957, p. 616). In mimicking the contract
price, the law provides here a pure cost-based recovery.
Now, contrast this with the rules governing discharge of the attorney working under a
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contingency-fee contract. Strikingly, the rules that have emerged across the states mirror the four
approaches described in Section I of this paper (Annotation, 1998). Some jurisdictions apply a
pure benefit-based recovery approach that simply enforces the contingency- fee agreement. As
soon as the underlying litigation concludes or settles—that is, as soon as the “benefit” to the
client, if any, becomes known—the dismissed attorney recovers her full contingency fee, minus
any expenses not incurred by the attorney in performing the balance of the contract. 15 If the suit
is ultimately successful, recovery is high; otherwise, the attorney recovers nothing.
Other jurisdictions apply a variant of a pure cost-based approach, which permits the
dismissed attorney to recover, in a quantum meruit claim, the reasonable value of her services
(i.e., her costs), but not the contingency fee. Neither the attorney’s right to recover, nor the
amount of that recovery, are affected by the outcome of the litigation. 16 In theory, a lesser-of
regime might still emerge in these jurisdictions if the client is permitted to dismiss the attorney
after the client obtains new information on the likelihood of success. Under such a scenario,
when the client learns that the suit is about to succeed (or to reach a favorable settlement), the
client would dismiss the original attorney and pay the attorney her costs, and when the client
learns that the suit is about to fail, the client would retain the attorney and pay her the contractual
contingency fee – nothing. However, courts recognize the danger of such manipulation, 17 and
thus the risk that clients can strategically create a lesser-of regime appears relatively small.
A third set of jurisdictions applies a greater-of approach by permitting the dismissed
__________________________________________________________
15

Tonn v. Reuter, 95 N.W.2d 261 (Wis. 1959).

16

See, e.g., Lai Ling Cheng v. Modansky Leasing Co., Inc., 539 N.E.2d 570 (N.Y. 1989) (holding that recovery in
quantum meruit may be “more or less than the amount provided in the contract”).
17

See, e.g., Fracasse v. Brent, 494 P.2d 9, 14 (Cal. 1972) (holding that an attorney discharged without cause under a
contingency-fee contract is normally limited to recovering the reasonable value of his services, but may recover the
full contingency fee when discharge occurs “on the courthouse steps”).
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attorney to elect her remedy. The attorney may collect either the reasonable value of her services
or her contingency fee minus any expense saved because of the termination. 18 Therefore, if the
award the client eventually collects is high, the attorney may elect the benefit-based measure of
recovery, namely, a fraction of the client’s award; otherwise the attorney may elect the costbased measure of recovery, namely, her hourly fee.
Lastly, some jurisdictions, including California, apply a lesser-of approach by limiting
the attorney’s recovery to the reasonable value of the services and then, only if the suit is
ultimately successful. 19 Thus, if the client receives a high award, the attorney gets the cost-based
measure of recovery (her hourly fee), whereas if the client receives no award, the attorney gets
the benefit-based measure of recovery (nothing). In these jurisdictions, the attorney who is
dismissed without cause will receive a lower expected recovery than under the contract
arrangement, or under either pure recovery regime.
A similar issue concerning recovery by contingency fee attorneys has come to the fore in
the settlement of state lawsuits against tobacco companies. The contractual arrangements
between the states and their outside (i.e., private) attorneys usually entitled the attorneys to a
pure benefit-based recovery measure, anywhere between 2% and 25% of the settlements. When
the tobacco industry agreed to settlements involving enormous sums, the attorneys’ combined
fees reached billions of dollars. Ex-post, this translated to hourly fees reaching, in some cases,
tens of thousands of dollars per hour. At that stage, lawmakers were ready to discharge the
__________________________________________________________
18

E.g., In re Downs, 363 S.W.2d 679, 686 (Mo. 1963) (a discharged contingency fee attorney “has the election to
claim a reasonable fee for the work done [...] or to wait until the claim is liquidated by judgment or settlement and
then sue [...] for his contract fee”).
19

E.g., Fracasse, 494 P.2d at 14; see also Rosenberg v. Levin, 409 So.2d 1016, 1021-22 (Fl. 1982); Chambliss,
Bahner & Crawford v. Luther, 531 S.W.2d 108, 113 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1975) (holding that “fees [...] should be limited
to the value of the services rendered or the contract price, whichever is less”).
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contingency fee arrangements and override the contracts. 20 Recognizing that these fees
overwhelmingly exceed standard legal hourly rates, commentators, judges, the Press, and many
lawmakers called these fees excessive, exorbitant, and even unconscionable (Brinkman, 1998).
Critics of the fees are effectively advocating a lesser-of recovery regime. If the suits had
been unsuccessful—as were most tobacco suits prior to the settlement—the plaintiffs’ attorneys
would have recovered no fees. But now that the states have prevailed against the tobacco
companies, the attorney fees have been scrutinized relative to hourly fees, and—as many critics
endorse—capped not to exceed standard (i.e., guaranteed) hourly rates. What critics overlook is
the enormous risk that many of these attorneys (albeit not all) had taken at the outset of the
litigation. Ex-ante, in light of the slim chance of victory against the tobacco industry and the
projected out-of-pocket cost to be incurred by the attorneys, the negotiated contingency fees
seem less excessive. Measuring in hindsight the per-hour fee that the attorneys in fact recovered
overlooks this risk factor. It is equivalent to the view that the holder of a winning lottery ticket is
unjustly enriched by collecting the award and that he should recover no more than the price paid
for the ticket. In this lesser-of regime, attorneys would be less willing to undertake risky projects
under contingency fee arrangements.
2. Indemnification of litigation costs
Another regime applying a hybrid approach to the recovery of attorney fees involves
indemnification of litigation costs. A party expending litigation costs to the benefit of others may
seek reimbursement from the beneficiaries, even in the absence of an express indemnification
agreement. The most common situation in which such an indemnity right is recognized occurs in
__________________________________________________________
20

See, e.g., 144 Cong. Rec. S6373-01, S6374 (remarks by Rep. Sessions) (“How can we violate contracts? We
violate contracts all the time in this body. […] Everything about the tobacco business is being changed by this
legislation. […] One of those aspects ought to be how much these fees should count for”).
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products liability litigation over a defective product, where a seller who has defended a suit
against the buyer seeks indemnity from the product’s manufacturer for any damages awarded or
legal expenditures. Recovery by the seller is based on quasi-contractual principles; the
manufacturer is considered the beneficiary of the seller’s defense because a successful defense
would bar the buyer from re-asserting the same claim against the manufacturer.
There are different approaches across jurisdictions regarding sellers’ rights to recover
legal expenses. Some jurisdictions allow a seller to recover reasonable legal expenses regardless
of the outcome of the litigation with the buyer. 21 These jurisdictions take a distinctly cost-based
approach to indemnification. If the seller expends a reasonable sum defending against the
buyer’s suit, the seller may recover its costs whether the benefit to the manufacturer is “low”
(because the buyer prevailed) or “high” (because the seller prevailed).
Other jurisdictions allow a seller to recover its legal expenses from the manufacturer, but
only—and surprisingly—when the seller loses in its defense against the buyer. 22 These
jurisdictions follow an inverted lesser-of approach to indemnification. If the seller expends a
reasonable sum defending against the buyer’s suit, the seller may recover its costs only if the
seller, and hence the manufacturer, is liable, that is, when the ex-post benefit of the defense to the
manufacturer is low. If the ex-post benefit to the manufacturer is high, that is, if the seller
prevails and the manufacturer thereby avoids liability for damages, the seller cannot recover its
legal expenses.
This lesser-of approach distorts sellers’ incentives to defend against product liability suits
__________________________________________________________
21

E.g., Booker v. Sears Roebuck & Co., 785 P.2d 297, 303 (Okla. 1989).

22

This doctrine is based on the notion that the burden of indemnification lies only on a liable manufacturer. By
succeeding in its defense against the buyer (thereby establishing also the absence of manufacturer’s liability), the
seller eliminates the basis for indemnification. See, e.g., Merck & Co., Inc. v. Knox Glass, Inc., 328 F.Supp. 374,
376 (E.D. Pa. 1971) (noting that “[i]ndemn ity arises where one is legally required to pay an obligation for which
another is primarily liable”).
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brought by buyers. The less-than- full indemnity induces sellers to act as less-than-perfect
defense agents of manufacturers. Sellers may decline to assert a defense against buyers to avoid
jeopardizing their indemnification rights.
3. Reimbursement of fees under statute
The third application of the hybrid approach involving attorney fees arises with respect to
a plaintiff’s right to recover attorney fees from a defendant. The general rule of American law is
that each party must bear its own litigation costs. But exceptions to the rule are found in state and
federal statutes that establish a right to recover litigation expenses from a defendant in a variety
of causes of action (Conte, 1993). From an economic perspective, these statutes are intended to
give individuals an added incentive to prosecute violations of the law, by reducing the expected
cost of pursuing claims, and to persuade attorneys to represent indigent clients, by enhancing the
prospects of getting paid for their services. Since most lawsuits involve a sure cost but confer
only a chance of victory and recovery, these statutes and their incentive effects are well captured
by the recovery-for-chance model, even though a plaintiff clearly does not undertake litigation
for the benefit of a defendant.
To recover under most fee-shifting statutes, the plaintiff must first have prevailed in the
underlying litigation. 23 The recovery is the n measured using the “lodestar” approach. To
calculate the lodestar, the court simply multiplies the number of hours the plaintiff’s attorney
worked on the successful portions of the case by a reasonable hourly rate. Importantly, this
hourly rate is usually the rate the attorney would charge for non-contingent work. The court may
then adjust the lodestar to take into account other factors such as the plaintiff’s degree of success
in the litigation. However, while the court may adjust the lodestar figure downward to account
__________________________________________________________
23

A party prevails where it recovers monetary damages from its opponent or where it vindicates significant nonmonetary interests in the litigation. See Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 433 (1983).
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for poor results obtained in litigation, it may not adjust the figure upward to account for such
factors as the risk involved in the litigation. 24
This statutory approach to recovery resembles a lesser-of hybrid regime. The regime
takes an element of the benefit-based approach by requiring that a party prevail in order to
recover anything at all. However, the regime takes a distinct element of the cost-based approach
by measuring recovery on the basis of the reasonable cost of services. Accordingly, where the
value of the suit turns out to be high, the prevailing party may recover only the cost of the
attorney’s services. Where the value of the suit turns out to be low or nominal, however, the
party recovers the ex-post assessment of the suit’s value—nothing or a reduced cost-based figure.
The statutory scheme provides less-than-optimal recovery: Whenever the probability of
prevailing in the suit is less than 1, the party and her attorney will be under-compensated by this
regime and may thus under- invest in litigation.
D. Recovery for Precautions
Another setting in which one party might invest to the benefit of another involves
accident prevention. A party who takes actions aimed at preventing a harm that might be suffered
by another, or for which another party might be liable, often has a claim to recovery, even in the
absence of a contract with the other party, on the basis of restitutionary principles. Recovery may
be measured by either the benefit conferred, or the reasonable cost of the precautions. If the
precautions eliminated an imminent risk, the benefit to the party-at-risk (or the party who is
liable for the risk) is readily apparent ex-post. Often, however, these precautions only reduce the
risk and do not eliminate it, and thus situa tions arise in which precautions that are cost-justified
ex-ante provide zero measurable benefit in hindsight. This might be the case if, even after the
__________________________________________________________
24

See, e.g., City of Burlington v. Dague, 112 S. Ct. 2638 (1992).
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precautions are taken, the harm—which due to the precautions has become less likely to occur—
nevertheless occurs. Or, it might turn out that the harm—which, without the precautions, was
more likely to occur—would nevertheless not have materialized. In either case, the ex-post
benefit from the precautions is zero.
In some situations, where the investing party is a professional performing a service that is
within her occupation, the law provides a pure cost-based recovery, equal to the service
provider’s standard contractual fee. For instance, a doctor who treats an unconscious accident
victim may recover her costs, irrespective of the actual benefit to the patient, which could be
either higher (if the risk was eliminated) or lower (if the precautions failed). In other situations
the law provides a pure benefit-based recovery. For instance, a salvor who comes to the aid of a
sinking ship may recover a portion of the value of the salvaged cargo and vessel, but only if the
efforts prove successful; this recovery schedule mirrors the “no cure, no pay” condition
commonly found in salvage contracts (Schoenbaum, 2001, §16-5).
Oftentimes, however, a lesser-of approach applies. One situation, which was identified by
Saul Levmore (1994), involves an insured party who takes precautions to reduce loss for which
she is insured. Whenever the precautions go beyond the preventive steps required under the
insurance agreement and reduce the likelihood of the insured-against harm, the insured party is
conferring a probabilistic benefit upon the insurer. If the precaution is determined ex-post to have
been successful in fully eliminating the harm, the insured may be able—although this is still
controversial—to recover from the insurer the costs of the precaution, even if the insurance
contract does not contain a “sue-and- labor” clause requiring the insurer to cover these charges. 25
If, however, the reasonable precaution fails to eliminate the harm which eventually materializes
__________________________________________________________
25

See Leebov v. U.S. Fidelity & Guaranty Co., 165 A.2d 82 (Pa. 1960). But see Schlosser Co., Inc. v. Ins. Co. of
North America, 600 A.2d, 836 (Md. 1992) for the opposite view.
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(and which becomes part of the insured’s claim), the insured is usually unable to recover the cost
of the precaution, as this precaution cannot be proven to ha ve benefited the insurer (Annotation,
1970). Unless there is a provision in the insurance contract covering the insured’s prevention
expenses, in which case recovery is independent of the success of the prevention effort, a quasicontractual claim to recover costs would fail in the absence of an ex-post benefit. Thus, when the
ex-post value of the precaution turns out to be high, the insured recovers only its costs—that is,
less than the ex-post value. Otherwise, when the ex-post value of the precaution is zero, the
insured recovers nothing. This “half-step” remedy, as Levmore calls it, or lesser-of approach as
we call it, provides inefficiently low incentives to take precaution.
E. Repairs and Improvements by Co-tenants
Property law also governs several types of investments having probabilistic benefits,
including repairs and improvements made on co-owned property. While repairs and
improvements are not always easily distinguished, the courts tend to treat them quite differently,
potentially creating a hybrid regime to govern these investments.
Consider first the rule governing repairs. In many jurisdictions, a co-tenant who repairs
property without the consent of her co-tenants may recover a portion of the cost of those repairs
from her non-contributing co-tenants in an action for partition or accounting (Dukeminier and
Krier 1998, pp. 358-9). These jurisdictions apply a cost-based recovery approach; if repairs are
reasonable, the investing tenant recovers the cost of the repairs (the portion commensurate with
the other tenant’s stake in the property) regardless of whether the repairs in fact benefit her
fellow tenants. For example, a mining company was able to recover one-half of the cost of
repairs to a railroad track it jointly owned with another company, even though the passive tenant
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used the rail far less than the investing tenant and thus derived relatively little benefit from it. 26
By contrast, the tenant who improves property without the consent of her co-tenants may
recover the increase in value of the property attributable to those improvements, but not their
cost, in an action for partition, or, in some jurisdictions, in an accounting (Dukeminier and Krier
1998, p. 360). This rule resembles a pure benefit-based recovery regime; the investing tenant
recovers the full benefit, if any, of the improvements she makes. For example, a co-tenant who
invested roughly $1,000 in clearing and draining land to use as pasture and crop acreage was
allowed to recover a portion of the enhancement value of such improvements, potentially totaling
more than $29,000. 27 The improving co-tenant may not, however, recover her costs where the
improvements do not increase the value of the property.
One type of distortion arises under the improvements doctrine when courts limit the
investing party to recovering the lesser-of the improvement value or its cost (Stoebuck and
Whitman, 2000, p. 208). According to this approach, when the improvement value is low, the
investing tenant can recover no more than the value added, which might be less than her cost;
and when the improvement value is high, the tenant can recover no more than her cost, which is
less than the value added. 28
A similar lesser-of approach is sometimes applied under the repairs doctrine as well.
Some courts will allow a co-tenant to recover for making repairs only if, in hindsight, the repairs
actually increased the value of the land. 29 For example, courts may find a repair to be
__________________________________________________________
26

Wagner Coal Co. v. Roth Coal Co., 267 S.W. 1096 (Ky. App. 1925) (noting that the investing tenant shipped fivetimes more coal on the rail than did the passive tenant).
27

Buschmeyer v. Eikermann, 378 S.W.2d 468 (Mo. 1964).

28

Madrid v. Spears, 250 F.2d 51, 54 (10th Cir. 1957).

29

Clifton v. Clifton, 810 S.W.2d 51, 54 (Ark. Ct. App. 1991) (re -characterizing repairs as improvements and
denying recovery on basis of evidence that joint tenant’s expenditures had not enhanced value of the property);
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unreasonable, and hence, not reimbursable, when the repair turns out not to affect the value of
the property, even though ex-ante the repair seemed like a good idea. As one commentator noted,
“the necessity of a repair has been determined in some instances by judging the results of the
mending process rather than by the nature of the repairing act” (Note, 1957).
Even more interestingly, the lack of a clear practical distinction between acts that
constitute “repairs” and acts that constitute “improvements” may permit an investing tenant to
create a greater-of regime for expenditures lying on the interface between the two categories of
investments. When courts cannot easily distinguish repairs and improvements (or simply refuse
to do so) a plaintiff is effectively accorded the power to choose the higher of the two measures of
recovery, cost or benefit. If the benefit is low, the tenant would sue to recover her costs under the
repairs doctrine; and if the benefit is high, the tenant would sue to recover the benefit under the
improvements doctrine.
It is easy to imagine how such a hybrid approach might arise in practice. Courts struggle
to classify some investments as either “improvements” or “repairs” across many areas of
property law, oftentimes using the two terms interchangeably despite the differing legal
treatment accorded each. Indeed, in a variety of cases, courts have (wittingly or unwittingly)
allowed the parties to manipulate the distinction between repair and improvement to their
advantage. 30 Given the lack of a clear distinction between the two types of investment and the
incentive of some parties to muddle them, the hybrid regime may emerge in borderline cases.

Womach v. Sandygren, 180 P. 922, 924 (Wash. 1919) (disallowing recovery for repairs where investing tenant
failed to show that the repairs enhanced the value of the property).
30

Compare Gilpin v. Brooks, 115 N.E. 421 (Mass. 1917) (holding that, although mortgagee is not allowed to make
permanent improvements on the property, he may finish a building if necessary to preserve its value, and the work
will be found to be repairs), with Warwik v. Harvey, 148 A. 592 (Md. 1930) (holding that a similar completion of a
building is an improvement in the context of the mistaken improver doctrine).
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F. Mistaken Improvements
A related doctrine concerns recovery for mistaken improvement of real property. An
investor might improve property she does not own when she unknowingly holds land under an
invalid title, mistakes the nature of her interest, or mistakes the location of her land. When the
mistake is exposed, an interesting question arises as to whether and how much the improver may
recover from the true owner of the land for the improvements.
In most jurisdictions, the mistaken improver who meets certain criteria, such as acting in
good faith and under the color of title, may recover from the true owner of the property
(Dickinson, 1985). Recovery, however, is capped so as not to exceed the lesser of the cost of the
investment or its value. For example, under the Restatement of Restitution (§42), the improver
may recover “to the extent that the land has been increased in value by [the] improvements, or
for the value of the labor and materials employed in making such improvements, whichever is
least.” Furthermore, many states have enacted betterment acts that accomplish the same result by
allowing the true owner to elect the remedy for the improver.
The mistaken improver doctrine takes a lesser-of approach to recovery. Ex-post, when the
improvement turns out to be valuable, the improver recovers only her costs, but when the
improvement turns out to be of little or no value, the improver recovers only that nominal sum.
The lesser-of approach could potentially distort ex-ante incentives. By reducing the recovery
from that which the parties would have agreed upon had they contracted (namely, a recovery
equal to either the cost of the investment or a portion of the benefit it creates), the Restatement’s
scheme dilutes incentives to invest and induces excessive caution prior to the unilateral
investment in improvements.
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III. WHY ARE H YBRID APPROACHES USED IN PRACTICE?
The analysis thus far has demonstrated that hybrid regimes distort incent ives to invest;
nonetheless, they underlie a wide variety of substantive legal doctrines. This Section explores
more systematically why such regimes are used in practice. Does the broad existence of these
regimes manifest the confusion of courts in distinguishing between ex-post (benefit-based) and
ex-ante (cost-based) conceptions of value, or can they be justified from either an economic or
alternative perspective?
In general, hybrid regimes are created in two ways. Some hybrid regimes are created
intentionally by courts or legislatures in order to adjust recovery and thus serve purposes that are
often unrelated to investment incentives. Part A explores such purposes and whether the hybrid
recovery structure is capable of furthering them. Other hybrid regimes are created inadvertently.
Parts B and C describe how problems of drawing boundaries between similar causes of action
and problems of information transform what were designed as pure recovery regimes into
inadvertent hybrid regimes.
A. Deliberate Adjus tment of the Recovery
Courts and legislatures occasionally employ hybrid recovery schemes deliberately, to
adjust the expected recovery for the investing party and thus serve other instrumental goals
unrelated to investment incentives. This Section considers a variety of such goals.
1. Provide Incentives to Contract or to Avoid Unsolicited Investment
One goal a downward adjustment might serve is to give investors incentives to contract
with beneficiaries or to avoid unsolicited investment. For example, a lesser-of regime, by
reducing an investor’s expected recovery, may give her incentives to verify title to her land
before making an improvement.
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While providing such incentives may be desirable policy, use of the lesser-of hybrid
regime is a misguided way to implement it, in several respects. First, if the policy is intended to
induce the investing party to contract with the beneficiary rather than make a unilateral
investment, or to take more care before making a mistaken improvement, better incentives might
arise if no recovery were allowed. Indeed, the doctrines that create restitution liability already
incorporate a fault standard: the right to recover is itself conditional on the investor either taking
sufficient care or not having reasonable opportunities to contract. For example, a mistaken
improver must show that she acted in good faith and under color of title before making her
improvements. Such conditions for the incidence of liability provide investors with adequate
incentives to take care and to contract, rendering unnecessary additional tinkering with the
magnitude of liability. Thus, in those cases where the investor has satisfied the “due care”
requirements like the ones embodied in the mistaken improver doctrine, it is unclear what
instrumental purpose, if any, a reduction of the damages award serves.
2. Protect “Innocent” Parties
Another stated purpose for the lesser-of approach is to protect “innocent” parties from
burdensome liability. For example, the Restatement of Restitution asserts that forcing an
“innocent” owner to pay the full value of improvements mistakenly placed on her land is harsh.
An innocent beneficiary of an illiquid benefit should not be forced to liquidate her property to be
able to pay for the improvements, proponents of the lesser-of approach assert. 31 Thus, the owner
should not have to pay for the full enhancement value. Further, even if the owner could afford to
pay, it seems unfair, from an ex-post perspective, to require an owner who received no
enhancement value to compensate a mistaken investor for the costs of the failed improvement
__________________________________________________________
31

REST . RESTITUTION § 42 cmt a (acknowledging that, while the rule is “harsh to the one making the improvements
by mistake . . . in many cases it would be still more harsh to require the one receiving the benefits to pay therefor”).
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effort. The lesser-of regime seems to perfectly serve this dual protective goal.
Upon careful examination, however, the lesser-of rule of the Restatement is more
difficult to justify. In the absence of any apparent wrongdoing, it is unclear why fairness
necessarily favors one innocent party over another, that is, why the owner, but not the equally
“innocent” and potentially cash-strapped mistaken improver, should be protected. More
fundamentally, even if some sort of reduction in liability is desirable, to protect the “autonomy”
of the owner who did not solicit the improvement, the reduction achieved through the lesser-of
regime is still ill-suited to this purpose. As the economic analysis in Section I demonstrated, the
lesser-of regime achieves a reduction in liability equal to the option value embodied in election
between the cost-based and the benefit-based values. The magnitude of this reduction depends
primarily on the variance, or the riskiness of the investment, a factor that is independent of the
reasons this reduction was deemed desirable in the first place. Thus, when the investment yields
a certain—instead of a probabilistic—benefit, there is no reduction in liability although the same
hardships confront the innocent landowner. Recognizing the probabilistic nature of the benefit
demonstrates, therefore, that the reduction in liability attained by the lesser-of rule is arbitrary: it
is not tailored to serve the goal motivating the reduction.
Another area in which the lesser-of reduction of liability is intended to ease the
compensatory burden placed on the beneficiary involves recovery for breach of a contingency
fee agreement. Here, courts applying the lesser-of approach intend to give the client greater
freedom to dissolve the relationship with his current attorney and enter into a better match with a
different attorney. The pure cost-based regime, according to some courts, is unfair to poor clients
who cannot afford to pay the attorney’s fees unless the client recovers in the suit. At the same
time, the pure benefit-based regime, according to these courts, would place an undue burden on
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the client’s right to dismiss her attorney, because the client might end up having to pay two
attorneys a full contingency fee. 32 It is less often recognized, however, that while the reduced
recovery accords greater freedom to the client, the added risk it places on the attorney might
diminish the attorney’s willingness to take on the client’s case on a contingency basis (recall that
billable-hours contracts are governed by different rules), or cause the attorney to raise her rates to
absorb the risk, both to the client’s detriment.
3. Deter wrongdoing
Finally, a hybrid approach may also be deliberately tailored to serve deterrent concerns.
For example, fiduciary and agency doctrines entitle a principal to a greater-of recovery against a
fiduciary or an agent who violates her duties to the principal. If the agent receives a large benefit
by violating her duty of loyalty (say, if the agent expropriates funds and invests them in her own
account successfully), the principal is entitled to recover the entire ex-post benefit. And if the
agent receives little or no benefit from the violation (say, if the agent’s investment failed), the
principal can alternatively recover damages equal to the value taken from the principal’s account
(Restatement 2d of Agency §407).
This greater-of rule can be rationalized on the basis of deterrence theory. Since many
violations of fiduciary and agency relationships go undetected, the risk of over-recovery, which
normally arises under the greater-of regime, is not much of a factor. By applying the greater of
the ex-post and the ex-ante recovery values, an increase in deterrence is achieved, countering
some of the effect of imperfect detection. That is, while the expected recovery under the hybrid
rule exceeds the expected value of the funds that were taken, this premium hardly measures up to
the “discount” enjoyed by the wrongdoer who goes undetected.
__________________________________________________________
32

E.g., Fracasse, 494 P.2d at 12-14.
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B. Overlap of Pure Regimes
The hybrid approaches are not always adopted deliberately. A hybrid regime might also
arise accidentally, where two different “pure” recovery regimes overlap. When a particular
investment can lead to recovery under two different causes of action, one employing a pure costbased recovery approach and the other employing a pure benefit-based recovery approach, a
hybrid regime might de facto govern this investment, for two reasons. First, courts may openly
defer to the investing party to elect which of the two causes of action to apply to her investment;
not surprisingly, she will elect the one that gives her the greater measure of recovery. This was
shown to be the case, for example, in the choice of remedies regime governing total breach of a
partially performed contract.
More interestingly, courts may not be able to prevent a party from opportunistically
pursuing one cause of action over another, as when the boundaries between two related causes of
action are imprecise. For example, the co-tenant repairs and improvements doctrines overlap in
some cases where an investment can be categorized as both a repair and an improvement. The
use of a cost-based approach in recovery for repairs and a benefit-based approach in recovery for
improvements may become a hybrid greater-of approach if the investing party can elect which of
the two doctrines to apply. To the extent that courts cannot draw a bright line between what
constitutes a repair versus an improvement, the investing party can effectively elect the greater of
the two pure recovery measures. Likewise, a problem of imprecise boundaries exists within the
implied contracts doctrine. To the extent that courts cannot draw a bright line between the
grounds for implied- in- fact and implied- in- law claims—and, at least in the context of
precontractual investment, such a line is difficult to draw—the investing party can claim the
greater recovery measure.
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Note that in the repair/improvement case, and to some extent in the implied contracts
case as well, courts do not openly permit the investing party to characterize her investment so as
to secure the higher recovery measure. In fact, if courts were aware of the problem, they might
be driven to draw more precise boundaries between existing amorphous causes of action.
Unfortunately, the type of sorting of claims that creates these greater-of regimes occurs “pretrial”, distant from the judge’s scrutiny, when potential plaintiffs privately design their pleading
strategies. In the usual case, a plaintiff pleads only one cause of action, either a pure ex-post or a
pure ex-ante recovery claim. It is only across cases that a greater-of pattern emerges.
C. Information Problems
Finally, and perhaps most interestingly, hybrid approaches might also emerge
inadvertently when courts lack the information necessary to apply a “pure” regime consistently
across a class of cases. In order to apply a pure benefit-based regime, courts must be able to
verify the actual benefit received. In order to apply a pure cost-based regime, courts do not need
to know the actual benefit, but they do need to know the cost of the investment and the ex-ante
distribution of benefits associated with the investment (to guarantee that the cost is reimbursed
only if it was reasonable). The discussion below demonstrates that when some of this
information is not readily verifiable in court, pure recovery regimes might be transformed into
hybrid regimes. Formally, the doctrine employs a pure approach to measuring recovery; in
practice, given information problems, it operates like a hybrid.
1. Information Regarding the Distribution of Benefits
To apply a cost-based recovery regime, courts need to calculate the ex-ante distribution
of benefits. In contrast to the benefit-based regime, in which courts need only measure the actual
realization of the benefit, under the cost-based regime courts need to assess whether the
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investment was reasonable in light of its projected benefits. In order to do that, courts have to
consider the range of possible benefits that were associated with the investment and their
associated likelihoods. That is, courts need to be able to measure not only the actual benefit that
materialized, but also hypothetical (or counter- factual) ones. When the difficulty in estimating
the prior distribution of benefits is accounted for, a pure cost-based recovery regime can be
transformed inadvertently into a lesser-of regime.
One of the factors that could—and we believe, in fact does—interfere with a court’s
ability to accurately assess the distribution of benefits at the time when the costly action was
taken is the hindsight bias. When a court knows the ex-post value of an investment, but does not
have enough information to determine its ex-ante expected value, it may draw an inference about
expected value from the value that was realized. If the actual benefit from the investment turns
out to be high, it is likely to appear cost-justified, and recovery of the cost would be allowed. If,
instead, the actual benefit from the investment turns out to be low or zero, the investment as a
whole might seem unreasonable, and recovery of the cost would be denied. Under these
conditions, a cost-based recovery regime, in which the investing party recovers her costs only if
they are reasonable, may turn into a lesser-of regime. 33
This hindsight bias can explain the emergence of the lesser-of regime in several of the
areas surveyed in Section II. For example, it can explain the lesser-of rule that sometimes
governs restitution for repairs made by co-tenants and the quasi-contractual recovery for
precautions. Some courts, when evaluating the reasonableness of certain repairs, condition the
right to recover repair costs on whether the repairs appear, in hindsight, to be justified. Thus, the
mere fact that the repairs did not add value ex-post is used to justify a conclusion that they were
__________________________________________________________
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Another possibility is that a court might mistakenly award recovery for an investment that was “unreasonable” exante, because, by chance, it proved valuable ex-post.
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not reasonable ex-ante and thereby to deny recovery of their costs. 34 Courts fail to see, in this
context, that even repairs that “failed” to generate value could have been reasonable when made.
Similarly, in assessing the desirability of precautions taken by an insured, courts already know
whether the precautions succeeded in preventing or reducing the loss, and are susceptible to a
well-documented hindsight bias (Rachlinsky, 1998). One of the effects of this bias is that when a
precaution fails to reduce the loss, courts draw an inference that it was not cost-justified in the
first place and refuse to award even the ex-ante measure of recovery. Another potential effect of
this bias might occur when, in hindsight, it is clear that the loss was avoided independently of the
precaution, which again might lead courts to wrongly conclude the that the precaution was
unjustified ex-ante and deny the recovery of its cost.
This “hindsight” problem is also illustrated in the debate over the plaintiff attorneys’ fees
stemming from the tobacco settlement. Either an hourly fee that is not contingent or a
contingency fee that is not truncated could adequately compensate the attorneys representing the
states. However, conditioning the recovery on success and then limiting it to the (guaranteed)
hourly fee creates a lesser-of regime. The rhetoric utilized by advocates of this regime suggests
that they fail to consider the substantial ex-ante likelihood that the contingency fee attorneys
could have received no recovery at all.
In theory, courts can avoid or mitigate the problems created by gaps in information by
adopting the “pure” regime for which the best information is available. If it is consistently
difficult for courts to assess the ex-ante value of any given type of investment, the courts could
instead apply an ex-post approach to govern those investments, assuming, of course, that
information about the actual benefit is relatively more obtainable.
__________________________________________________________
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See, e.g., Clifton v. Clifton, 810 S.W.2d 51, 54 (Ark. 1991) (no recovery of cost of repair when it added no value
to the property).
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2. Verifiability of the Actual Benefit
A different type of information problem might arise if courts cannot easily verify the
actual benefit. Because it is the defendant/beneficiary who usually possesses the best information
regarding the benefit enjoyed, the defendant might manipulate the type of information he reveals
to the court. Recognizing the plaintiff’s difficulty in proving the magnitude of the benefit she
conferred upon the defendant, courts might allow a plaintiff who cannot prove the magnitude of
the benefit to at least recover her costs, whenever these costs appear reasonable. Namely, in
asymmetric information environments, courts might be willing to award recovery based on the
full ex-post benefit enjoyed by the defendant whenever reliable information about the actual
benefit is provided, but award only some ex-ante measure (either cost or expected benefit)
otherwise. This adjudication regime quickly transforms into a lesser-of regime if the defendant
can selective ly disclose information. The defendant would hide information about his actual
benefit whenever this benefit is high, thereby limiting the plaintiff to the more moderate costbased measure of recovery. And conversely, the defendant would reveal information about his
actual benefit whenever this benefit is low, to limit the magnitude of the plaintiff’s recovery to
the (low) actual benefit. To the extent that discovery procedures enable the defendant to
manipulate information in this way, the plaintiff is effectively governed by a lesser-of regime.
The limited ability of courts to verify actual benefits might also translate into a greater-of
regime, when it is the plaintiff who can manipulate the information provided to the court. One
way the plaintiff can control the informational-basis of the recovery is by affecting the timing of
the suit. A plaintiff who, on the basis of private information, knows that the ex-post benefit will
be low, can time her suit prior to the verifiable realization of the benefit, expecting the court,
which cannot verify the actual benefit, to employ instead a cost-based recovery measure.
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Conversely, a plaintiff who knows that the ex-post benefit will be high can await the verifiable
realization of the benefit and recover the full ex-post value.
3. Information about the Cost of the Investment
Another type of information problem arises when courts cannot verify the cost of the
investment. Because of the stochastic nature of the benefit, any given observable ex-post
realization of benefit can be associated with any number of different costs of investment. This
problem might be particularly acute in the context of pre-accident precautions taken by an
insured party. As many of the precaution measures that the insured can take are both nonverifiable in court and non-observable to the insurer, it is less puzzling why the parties to the
insurance arrangement do not contract over them and why the courts cannot apply the pure costbased recovery rule to them. Courts must look to the verifiable benefit to ascertain, not only
whether the precaution was desirable, but also whether the alleged precaution was ever taken.
Thus, when the realization of the benefit is high, the inference that some unobservable precaution
had been taken is more plausible than when the benefit is low. When a ship sinks, courts are less
likely to believe that the insured ship-owner took the necessary, yet subsequently futile,
precautions. A cost-based recovery regime might, in the presence of this Bayesian inference
strategy, transform into a lesser-of regime.
However, the lesser-of regime applied in practice to precautions taken by insured parties
cannot be fully explained as a by-product of this information problem. If the non-verifiability of
the precaution investments were the reason for the transformation of a cost-based rule into a
lesser-of rule, one would expect that in cases where precautions are observable and verifiable a
pure cost-based regime would survive. This, however, is not the case. While many pre-accident
precautions are indeed non-verifiable, most post-accident harm- reducing mitigation actions taken
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by the insured—which are another category of precautions—are more easily observable and
verifiable, and yet are subject to the same lesser-of rule. For example, the actions taken by a
ship’s crew to avoid maritime hazards prior to an accident (e.g., safer routes, maintenance of
machinery) might be non- verifiable, whereas actions taken by the crew to reduce the harm after
an accident (e.g., raise a sinking vessel) are more readily verifiable. Case law, however, can
hardly be partitioned according to this verifiability property of precautions; the adherence to the
lesser-of rule and the denial of recovery for failed precautions are more robust than this
conjecture would imply.
CONCLUSION
This article has identified a distortion in the structure of legal rules that deal with chance.
Although the type of uncertainty examined here—uncertainty over the value of the investment—
is (usually) resolved by the time the law steps in to determine the recovery, the confusion
between the ex-ante (cost-based) and the ex-post (benefit-based) measures of value leads to
hybrid recovery practices with their associated distortions. By identifying the generality of the
problem—potentially arising any time the net external benefit of an investment is probabilistic—
the analysis can be applied to any situation that exhibits this structure. The article explored some
half-dozen applications of the hybrid approaches, all from seemingly unrelated areas of law, but
all sharing the same analytical structure. The list is, of course, far from exhaustive. Accordingly,
the usefulness of the analysis would prove greater to the extent that the trans-substantive tool
offered here is found applicable within other areas of the law as well.
One possible application of the analysis is extending it to the case of probabilistic costs,
rather than benefits. Some investments, say, in improving property have fairly certain benefits
but involve random costs (e.g., excavating land). Here, too, in the absence of a contract the
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investing party may be subject to a hybrid recovery regime. For example, the law of special
assessment, which taxes property owners for improvements made by the city near their property,
allows the city to recover at most its costs, not to exceed the enhancement value of the affected
properties. 35 According to the analysis in this paper, this lesser-of regime diminishes the city’s
incentives to make socially valuable improvements.
The analysis in this paper can be read “narrowly”, as a remark on the benefit principle
within the law of quasi-contract. Under this principle, the liable party has to pay only when an
actual benefit is conferred upon him. The analysis in this paper provides an argument for
expanding the definition of benefit to include, not only actual benefits, but also potential yet
unrealized benefits. Receiving a chance for enrichment is valuable to the beneficiary in similar
fashion that receiving a lottery ticket is beneficial. Recovery, though, has to be consistent across
realizations. If the beneficiary pays only for the ex-ante value of the chance when the chance
materializes ex-post into a substantial benefit, he should also pay for the value of the chance
when a benefit does not materialize ex-post.
Lastly, this paper can be read more broadly, as a comment on the appropriate interface
between cost-based and benefit-based liability in private law. Costly actions that are identical
from an ex-ante, cost-based perspective, can appear dissimilar ex-post, once the stochastic
benefit from them materializes. This appearance can lead—and as we showed, it has often led—
courts to apply an inconsistent treatment of the right to recovery, bouncing in an arbitrary fashion
between cost-based and benefit-based liability. While the paper does not take a position
concerning the choice between the two pure methods of measuring liability, it highlights the
distortion that an inconsistent choice creates.
__________________________________________________________
35

E.g., McNally v. Teaneck, 379 A.2d 446 (N.J. 1977).

37
http://repository.law.umich.edu/law_econ_archive/art19

40

Ben-Shahar and Mikos:

RECOVERY FOR NON-CONTRACTUAL INVESTMENT
References
Annotation. 1957 “Measure or Ba sis of Attorney’s Recovery on Express Contract Fixing
Noncontingent Fees, Where He is Discharged Without Cause or Fault on His Part,” 54
A.L.R.2d 604.
_____. 1970 “Recoverability, Under Property Insurance or Insurance Against Liability for
Property Damage, of Insured’s Expenses to Prevent or Mitigate Damages,” 33 A.L.R. 3d
1262.
_____. 1998. “Limitation to Quantum Meruit Recovery, Where Attorney Employed Under
Contingent-Fee Contract is Discharged Without Cause,” 56 A.L.R.5th 1.
Atiyah, Patrick S. 1979. The Rise and Fall of Freedom of Contract (Oxford University Press)
Brinkman, Lester. 1998. “Will Legal Ethics Go Up in Smoke?,” WALL ST. J. A18 (June 16,
1998).
Conte, Alba. 1993. Attorney Fee Awards (2nd Ed., Shepards Pub.)
Dickinson, Kelvin H. 1985. “Mistaken Improvers of Real Estate,” 64 N.C. L. Rev. 37.
Dukeminier, Jesse, and James Krier, Property (4th Ed., New York: Aspen).
Farnsworth, E. Alan. 1987. “Precontractual Liability and Preliminary Agreements: Fair Dealings
and Failed Negotiations,” 87 COLUM . L. REV. 217.
_____. 1999. Contracts (3rd Ed., )
Hazard, Geoffrey C. and W. William Hodes. 2000. The Law of Lawyering (3rd Ed., New York:
Aspen Pub.)
Jackson, Thomas. 1978. “Anticipatory Repudiation and the Temporal Element of Contract Law:
An Economic Inquiry into Contract Damages in Cases of Prospective Nonperformance,”
31 STAN. L. REV. 69.

38
Published by University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository, 2003

41

Law & Economics Working Papers Archive: 2003-2009, Art. 19 [2003]

RECOVERY FOR NON-CONTRACTUAL INVESTMENT
Kull, Andrew. 1994. “Restitution as a Remedy for Breach of Contract,” 67 S. CAL L. REV. 1465.
Landes, William, and Richard A. Posner. 1978. “Salvors, Good Samaritans, and Other Rescuers:
An Economic Study of Law and Altruism,” 7 J. LEG. STUD. 83.
Levmore, Saul. 1985. “Explaining Restitution,” 71 VA . L. REV. 65.
_____. 1994. “Obligation or Restitution for Best Efforts,” 67 S. CAL. L. REV. 1411.
Note. 1957. “Right of Cotenant to Contribution from other Cotenants for Unauthorized Repairs
and Improvements Made to the Common Property,” 32 NOTRE DAME L. R. 493.
Polinsky, A. Mitchell, and Steven Shavell. 1994. “Should Liability Be Based on the Harm to the
Victim or the Gain to the Injurer?,” 10 J. L. ECON. & ORG. 427 (1994).
______. 1998. “Punitive Damages: An Economic Analysis,” 111 HARV. L. REV. 869.
Posner, Richard A. 1998. Economic Analysis of Law (5th Ed., New York: Aspen Pub.)
Rachlinsky, Jeoffrey J. 1998. “A Positive Psychological Theory of Judging in Hindsight,” 65 U.
CHI. L. REV. 571.
Schoenbaum, Thomas J. 2001. Admiralty and Maritime Law (3rd Ed., West).
Stoebuck, William B. and Dale A. Whitman. 2000. The Law of Property (3rd ed.).
Williston, Samuel. 1960. A Treatise on the Law of Contracts (3rd Ed.).
Wittman, Donald. 1995. “Should Compensation be Based on Costs or Benefits?,” 5 Int’l Rev. L
& Econ. 173.

39
http://repository.law.umich.edu/law_econ_archive/art19

42

